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Several safeguards against surprise are available to the de-
fendant in a criminal trial. The elaborate requirements to which
the indictment must conform guarantee a full understanding of
the prosecution's charge in advance of trial. Also, a bill of partic-
ulars is available in appropriate cases,20 and a continuance may
be allowed in the event of surprise. 21 Should the defendant be
afforded further and more detailed information by being allowed
to insist that the prosecution expose its evidence in the opening
statement? The rule that evidence not referred to at the opening
of trial is inadmissable affords another technicality of the crim-
inal law by means of which astute defense lawyers may thwart
an unwary prosecutor and incidentally defeat justice. It adds
another complicating factor to the already over-elaborate and
highly technical body of exclusionary rules of evidence. If such
a rule is to obtain, it should apply only to testimony whose im-
port the jury is unable to understand because it was omitted
from the opening statement. Confusion of the jury, not surprise
to the defendant, should be the test.2 2
A.B.R.
LABOR LAW-ANTI-TRUST ACTs-RETRAINT OF COMPETITION-
The defendant union seized and occupied the petitioner's shop,
inflicted heavy material damage, and on three occasions refused to
allow the shipment of finished goods to purchasers in other states.
The petitioner brought this action to recover treble damages
under the Sherman Act' as amended by the Clayton Act.2 Held,
although the effect of the sit-down strike was to restrict substan-
tially the interstate transportation of the petitioner's product,
there could be no recovery as there was no "restraint upon com-
20. Arts. 235, 288, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928. It has been held that
the bill of particulars should be granted where the short form of Indictment
is used. State v. White, 172 La. 1045, 136 So. 47 (1931). But It would seem
that, in any case, the granting of a request for a bill of particulars lies within
the discretion of the trial judge, and is not a matter of right. State v. Ezell,
189 La. 151, 179 So. 64 (1938).
21. Arts. 320-326, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928.
22. If the criterion of admissibiity of evidence not mentioned in the open-
ing statement be the ability of the jury to understand and apply such evi-
dence, every Louisiana case in which evidence has been excluded under the
present interpretation would have reached a contrary result. In each case a
confession was the evidence not alluded to (supra, note 9). It seems certain
that a jury can understand and apply a confession whenever introduced,
and whether or not it is preceded by mention in the opening statement
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1891), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1927).
2. 38 Stat. 730 (1915), 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1927).
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mercial competition in the marketing of goods or services." Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940).s
Prior to the instant decision the cases of this kind which had
come before the Supreme Court could be divided into three clas-
sifications. The first class was composed of cases where there was
a clear showing of intent on the part of the union to restrain com-
mercial competition by preventing or obstructing the free flow of
goods in interstate commerce. An example of this type of situa-
tion is furnished by the Second Coronado case' in which the
court found that the purpose of the union program, which in-
cluded the destruction of the complainant's coal mine, was to
prevent complainant's non-union coal from competing in inter-
state markets with union made coal. The result of such competi-
tion had been to threaten the relations of the union with opera-
tors of unionized mines in other states, who were suffering from
the competition with non-union coal producers. Such conduct
was held to be a violation of the Sherman Act.
The second classification comprised cases such as Loewe v.
Lawlor.5 There the purpose of the union was not to drive the
complainant's product out of interstate markets to protect union
competitors in whose success the union had no interest. Rather
the union was attacking the interstate sales of the complainant's
hats solely in an effort to paralyze its business to such an extent
that unionization of the plant would be necessary. No interest of
competitors appeared to be at stake. The price at which com-
plainant's hats sold in interstate markets was not at issue. Never-
theless, the movement of goods in interstate commerce was
directly under attack, and this was held to be in contravention
of the act.
3. The court pointed out that the law was enacted in an era of trusts
and combinations of business and capital organized to control the market by
suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and services. This was
the meaning of "restraint of trade" as used in the act, which does not con-
demn all conspiracies and combinations which interrupt interstate com-
merce.
4. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U.S. 295,
45 S. Ct. 551, 69 L.Ed. 963 (1925). See also United States v. Brims, 272 U.S.
549, 47 S.Ct. 169, 71 L.Ed. 403 (1926) (where there was a conspiracy of the
manufacturers of mill-work, building contractors, and union carpenters to
check competition by non-union made mill-work from other states); Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 S.Ct. 396,
78 L.Ed. 804 (1934).
5. 208 U.S. 274, 28 S.Ct. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488 (1908). See also Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 402, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911);
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349
(1921); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S.
37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927).
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In the third group fell those cases where there was no inten-
tion to restrain interstate commerce, either by overcoming dam-
aging price competition or stopping interstate sales." In these sit-
uations the court refused to find a violation of the anti-trust acts.
Although interstate commerce may have been affected by the
union activity, the effect was merely incidental to a program
local in origin and purpose.
In the instant case, despite the fact that the union expressly
refused to permit the manufacturer to deliver to an out-of-state
customer a certain quantity of finished goods, the court declined
to admit that there was a restraint within the purview of the
Sherman Act.7 The principal question which arises concerns the
effect of the present decision on cases falling within the second
classification referred to above. Clearly, cases in the third group
are unaffected. The formula applied by the court suggests that
the decision is not to be understood as exempting from the appli-
cation of the anti-trust acts situations in which there is an at-
tempt on the part of the union to prevent competition between
non-union and union goods in interstate markets.
Under the decisions dealing with the second classification, a
finding of intent to obstruct or restrain interstate commerce ap-
pears to have been considered sufficient, although the competitive
angle was not present. Therefore, the express refusal of the union
in the instant case to permit the shipment of certain finished
goods would appear at first to be a direct interference with inter-
state commerce in violation of the acts. However, such a conclu-
sion may be avoided by adopting the view that, in spite of the
fact mentioned, the interstate business of the petitioner was not
under direct attack, and this one instance of intentional inter-
ference was not sufficiently grave to support a finding that the
Sherman Act had been violated. In emphasizing the importance
of the fact that there was no showing that the union was attempt-
ing to restrain commercial competition in the marketing of goods
or services in interstate commerce, the court has thrown consid-
erable doubt on the present effect of such landmark cases as
6. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co,, 259 U.S. 344,
42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1922); United Leather Workers' I. U. v. Herkert
& Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 44 S.Ct. 623, 68 L.Ed. 1104 (1924).
7. The lower court reached the same decision, stating that the action
was local in motive and effect, and the effect on interstate commerce was
"indirect and remote." The court relied on United Mine Workers of America
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975 (1922) and United
Leather Workers' I. U. v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 44 S.Ct.
623, 68 L.Ed. 1104 (1924).
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Loewe v. Lawlor, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering," and Bed-
ford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n.9 In those
cases it does not clearly appear that the court found, or consid-
ered it necessary to find, that the union was undertaking to pre-
vent the interstate sale of the particular product in competition
with the product of union producers. Yet, such a basis of distinc-
tion was employed in the present case.10 A fair inference is that
those cases can no longer safely be depended upon as rendering
interstate union cooperation unlawful, in the absence of a finding
that there was an intent to restrain competition in the marketing
of goods or services."
H. W. W., JR.
MINERAL LEASE--WARRANTY-DAMAGES FOR EVICTIoN-Plain-
tiffs sued to have themselves declared owners of an undivided
one-fourth interest in a tract of land and to cancel a mineral
lease thereon, insofar as it affected their interest. The lease, cov-
ering an undivided one-half interest in the tract, had been granted
to the defendant Texas Company by the defendant Hunt. It con-
tained the customary warranty of title clause. Upon a finding
in favor of the plaintiffs, the lessee called his lessor in warranty,
praying for a judgment for the amount of one-fourth of the ex-
penses of drilling a well.' Held, the expense of drilling should
not be included as an item of "damage and loss" for which the
lessor is answerable. Martel v. Hunt, 197 So. 402 (La. 1940).
By warranting title to the land leased, the lessor obligated
8. 254 U.S. 443, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349 (1921).
9. 274 U.S. 37, 47 S.Ct. 522, 71 L.Ed. 916 (1927).
10. Loewe v. Lawlor was distinguished from Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
60 S.Ct. 982, 998 (1940). In the latter case the court stated that in Loewe v.
Lawlor the "restraint alleged was not a strike or refusal to work in the com-
plainants' plant, but a secondary boycott by which, through threats to the
manufacturer's wholesale customers and their customers, the Union sought
to compel or induce them not to deal in the product of the complainants and
to purchase the products of other unionized manufacturers." (Italics sup-
plied.) Similar language was employed in distinguishing the Duplex case and
the Bedford case.
11. In reviewing the history of the Sherman Act the court emphasized
the fact that protection of the consuming public from practice in restraint
of free competition was the primary aim of the act. Presumably, the interest
of purchasers and consumers was not sufficiently at stake under the circum-
stances of the instant case to warrant the invocation of the anti-trust law.
1. Warranty claims were also made for one-half of cash bonuses paid
lessor for the lease and for one-half of the royalty paid him out of the oil
produced. Both these claims were allowed.
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